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Abstract 
As part of local welfare in Italy, housing policies underwent reforms that emphasized the 
role of local governments – and cities in particular – in the definition of the problem and in 
the elaboration of possible solutions. Housing is quite neglected in the political debate, but 
it is increasingly important for responding to citizens’ demands in times of economic crisis. 
This paper reconstructs the policy process in two Italian cities, Turin (1997-2011) and 
Florence (1995-2011). The paper argues that policy change in housing can be fostered by a 
local political leadership that invests ideational, relational and positional resources in policy-
making to spread new ideas, build networks of public and private actors at the local level, 
and attract fiscal resources while taking advantage of windows of opportunity at different 
institutional levels. Moreover, collaboration with local bureaucratic leadership proves 
fundamental to promoting innovative policies. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since in the 1990s, welfare policies in Italy have experienced different episodes of 
reform, with a resulting differentiation of forms of local welfare along territorial and sector 
lines (Maino and Neri 2011; Vampa 2017). In this process, sub-national governments such 
as regions, provinces and municipalities emerged as key actors in policy-making, though with 
different roles and discretionality (Madama 2009; Bifulco et al. 2008; Baldini e Baldi 2014; 
Artioli 2016). Policy-making is increasingly affected by horizontal relations (with civil society 
and the third sector) and by vertical relations (with other institutional actors at the regional 
and national level), and local political and bureaucratic leaders emerge as key actors in 
governance networks (Bagnasco and Le Galés 2000; Pinson 2002). 
In Italy, public housing policies represent a type of welfare policy in which local 
governments now play a major role (Minelli 2004; Caruso 2017). This phenomenon has 
followed the same pattern of territorial differentiation as other welfare policies (Tosi and 
Cremaschi 2001), with a redefinition of the network of policy actors both horizontally (with 
the increasing role of the market and the presence of a variety of private actors) and vertically 
(with the retrenchment of the central state and the decentralization of policy-making).  
In particular, the importance of planning instruments approved by municipal 
governments and the empowerment of municipal executives with the direct election of 
mayors have emphasized the role of political leaders as key actors in the promotion of policy 
change and innovation in agenda setting and policy formulation (Magnier 2006; Maggioni 
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2017). In public housing policies in Italy, the role of local political leaders is even more 
important given the substantial retrenchment of the national government from active 
housing policies.  
Hence, without denying the role of bureaucratic leadership, this article aims to show 
the role of local political leadership in fostering policy change (as innovation in goals, frames 
and instruments) by focusing on distinctive activities in agenda setting and in the formulation 
of policy alternatives at the local level (Greasley and Stoker 2008; Gains et al. 2009). Although 
this article does not present a proper evaluation of the policy outcomes and policy success 
in the implementation (which depends on a number of exogenous and endogenous variables) 
(Sabatier and Mazmanian 1980), it argues that collaboration between the political and 
managerial leaders in the definition of policy solutions helps to secure policy innovation even 
after the formulation phase.  
The argument is that change is fostered not only through the promotion of new ideas, 
frames, and networks but also by the ability to attract resources from the national level. All 
of this is not possible without the activation of local political leadership. In other words, 
policy change in a highly contentious and fragmented policy such as housing is supported by 
the presence of a political leadership that a) uses its ideational resources to promote a 
different policy frame on housing policies, intended as the set of ideas and symbols that help 
policymakers legitimize policy solutions (Campbell 1998, 385), b) activates relational ties at 
the local level to expand the policy network and c) accesses other levels of government to 
take advantage of different windows of opportunity. 
From a theoretical perspective, this article proposes to consider policy change in the 
agenda and in the formulation phase as influenced by a composite policy entrepreneurship 
(Kingdon 1995; Mintrom and Norman 2009) involving both the political and the 
bureaucratic leadership. Policy entrepreneurship is intended as a type of collective activity 
that relies heavily on ideational, relational and formal resources to be used to attract fiscal 
transfers and to promote the relationship between public and private actors in local 
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governance (Navarro-Yáñez, et al. 2008). In particular, political leaders may be the main 
characters in policy entrepreneurship due to their ability to attract relational, ideational and 
economic resources from both the European level (for example, with the participation of 
supranational networks and grant competitions) and the national level (using national funds 
for housing and mega sports events). 
Following a qualitative approach, press releases on local newspapers and documentary 
analysis were used to analyse the policy process in two cases: housing policies in the city of 
Turin (1997-2011) and in the city of Florence (1995-2011). Twenty semi-structured b local 
politicians, local civil servants (such as the city manager, the heads of housing and budget 
divisions, and the directors of municipal offices for housing), and local stakeholders were 
extensively used to describe the influence of political and bureaucratic actors in promoting 
change in housing policies. 
 
 
 
2. Housing policy in Italy: when the State retreats and the cities come in 
 
Housing policies provide a good example to investigate the role of agency in local 
welfare and to determine whether and how political leadership can play a role in fostering 
policy change through collaboration with local civil servants and top managers (such as the 
head of housing division and the city manager). In Europe, different country legacies exist 
(Maclennan and O’Sullivan 2013), but housing as a collective problem is increasingly 
important, especially in periods of economic crisis (Housing Europe 2015). National states 
have recently converged in two directions: first, the decentralization of powers towards 
regional and municipal governments, with a retrenchment of the State; second, the increasing 
importance of private and nonprofit actors as promoters, operators and sponsors for housing 
construction and renting (Caruso 2017).  
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In Italy, public housing policies have traditionally shown a weak involvement of the 
state, with very limited public expenditure and a small stock of public housing (Tosi and 
Cremaschi 2001; Minelli 2004). In the post-war period, the centre-left national government 
promoted public housing to sustain urbanization processes, such as the INA-Casa 
programme, subsequently GESCAL (law 60/1963), which remained one of the pillars for 
the construction of subsidized housing (edilizia sovvenzionata) until the end of the 2000s. More 
recently, the policy was characterized by a differentiation of policy instruments for supported 
housing (in the form of assisted housing/edilizia agevolata and agreed housing/edilizia 
convenzionata); great regional variance with an increased role of local authorities 
(decentralization) and private actors; and a general decline in public investments, with a shift 
away from government regulation towards market mechanisms.  
After the dismissal of most traditional housing policies in the 1980s, few resources 
were invested in the 1990s in the “integrated urban programmes” for urban renewal and 
regeneration. Traditional housing was transformed into subsidies for families with direct or 
indirect money transfers (law 431/1998, replacing the rent act established by law 392/1978 
and creating a fund to sustain rents in the market, the Fondo Sociale per l’Affitto). In 2000, 
national schemes for public housing definitively concluded, and the lack of financial 
resources became the major problem for this policy. While the national governments 
intervened with episodic measures, private actors in real estate ruled the market, and the role 
of local bank foundations became increasingly important to finance housing programmes 
(Caruso 2017). 
At the municipal level, housing policies are increasingly integrated with urban planning 
and with other welfare and territorial policies, such as social assistance. For example, land 
use plans may establish the provision of units of social housing within new private housing, 
or local governments may differentiate their supply of housing services, such as subsidized 
leases in favour of low-income citizens or experimental programmes of social housing 
(Urbani 2010, 256-266). 
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Municipal governments, local offices and management corporations are currently 
prominent actors in housing policies due to the control of knowledge resources regarding 
the substantive aspects of the policy. They control the information on the housing stock and 
on the housing demand for their territories. Moreover, the management duties have been 
moved from the provincial to the municipal level. At the same time, the financing of the 
different housing initiatives requires more collaboration with local private actors.  
Given the endemic scarcity of resources, bureaucratic rigidity and implementation gaps 
(Minelli 2004), housing policies provide a clear example of the hurdles of policy change. At 
the same time, the decentralization of housing policies and the introduction of new policy 
instruments may provide institutional and organizational opportunities for astute policy 
entrepreneurs to respond to housing needs in new ways despite the constraints of scarce 
financial resources (Mintrom and Norman 2009, 652). In this article, the focus is on the 
contribution of local political and bureaucratic leaders to policy change. 
Policy change is defined as a modification in the constitutive elements of a policy 
programme that considers both the guiding principles of the policy (the ends) and the policy 
instruments selected accordingly (the means) at different levels of abstraction (Howlett and 
Cashore 2007, 55). In this paper, I choose to concentrate on policy change that emerges in 
the agenda setting phase and in the formulation phase, seen as chaotic processes where 
ambiguity abounds (Zahariadis 2007). This is coherent with one of the most common 
metaphors of the policy process in policy analysis. Kingdon (1995) describes the policy 
process as a context where problems, political interests and policy solutions constantly flow 
as separate streams. Change occurs when policy entrepreneurs take advantage of a window 
of opportunity to match a new definition of the problem with their pet policy solutions. This 
is an easier task when the policy entrepreneur is also a policy-maker who works in 
collaboration with experts (Natali 2004; Zachariadis 2007).  
I argue that both local bureaucracies and political leaders can play a decisive role as 
policy entrepreneurs in sustaining change precisely because of their ability to access other 
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levels of government, to build governance networks with local private partners and to spread 
new ideas about housing problems and solutions.  
 
 
2.1 Research design and case selection 
In this paper, housing policies are studied at the city level by examining the policy 
goals, intended as general ideas on policy development; the policy objectives that the policy 
formally aims to address; the instruments in terms of the mechanisms and/or calibration of 
policy means (Howlett and Cashore 2007, 55); and examples of policy outputs. Policy 
outcomes are not evaluated here because of the less important role of political leaders in the 
implementation phase.  
Therefore, the dependent variable is the promotion in housing policies of new policy 
goals, policy objectives, and instruments. Housing policies in Turin and Florence can be seen 
as similar systems in which many relevant aspects are constant except for the one whose 
explanatory power we assess empirically, namely, local political and bureaucratic leadership. 
In other words, I am not comparing two cities but the two contexts where similar problems, 
solutions and political relations are in place. Despite the socio-economic differences of Turin 
and Florence (the former being larger in population and more industrialized, the latter being 
smaller and oriented towards tourism and rent), the housing policies of both cities are similar 
in their starting conditions considering how pressing housing distress was, how the problem 
was defined, and the political orientation of municipal policy-makers at the time. Therefore, 
this case selection is appropriate to assess at least the presence of a causal role of local political 
leadership in housing policies in Italy. In fact, the comparison is intended to show that leaders 
may act as causal drivers of innovation by interacting with the context in different ways, thus 
supporting or hindering policy change (Falleti and Lynch 2009; Bakir and Jervis 2017).  
As mentioned, housing proved to be a serious problem in both Turin and Florence. 
For example, the percentage of evictions for economic reasons among the resident 
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population grew between 2001 and 2011 both in Turin (from 16% to 35%) and in Florence 
(from 8% to 14%) (Ministero dell’Interno 2012, 57, 73). Thus, both cities experienced serious 
housing distress, with increasing protests and abusive occupations. 
Second, both Turin and Florence showed similar situations with regard to politics, 
considering both the ideological orientation and the stability of the governing coalition. In 
the 1997-2011 period, both cities experienced the consolidation of the institutional model of 
the directly elected mayor (Fabbrini 2001; Magnier 2006) and were governed by a centre-left 
coalition. In the first administrative term (five years), two non-partisan mayors (Castellani in 
Turin and Primicerio in Florence) represented the reaction to the crisis of the Italian party 
system; in the following term, the centre-left coalition was confirmed, and two partisan 
mayors were elected (Chiamparino and Domenici). Moreover, the responsibilities for 
housing policies were delegated to the more leftist components of the governing coalition 
(Rifondazione Comunista, RC, then Partito della Rifondazione Comunista, PRC) both in 
Turin and in Florence. 
Third, the scarcity of financial resources – especially in terms of fiscal transfers from 
the centre – was considered the main deficiency of housing on the side of policies and 
solutions in both cities. At the same time, the early 2000s were considered the season for 
experimentation with new governance instruments (Pinson 2002; Winkler 2007; Governa 
and Saccomanni 2009; Manzoni 2017; Caruso 2017). 
Thus, I argue that the comparison of housing policies in Turin and Florence can be 
useful for local leadership to emerge as a significant piece of the puzzle of policy change in 
a contentious policy such as housing.  
 
3. The importance of political leaders as policy entrepreneurs in local governments 
 
As mentioned, agency can play a major role in fostering policy change through the 
opening of a window of opportunity. Through this window, agents introduce their solutions 
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into the agenda and build networks of actors to sustain change. Although policy 
entrepreneurs are often seen as experts and as outsiders, they can also enjoy formal 
institutional roles, such as being members of the executive or elected officials (Natali 2004). 
My point is that policy change and innovation at the local level can be eased by a collective 
effort of political and bureaucratic leaders. In particular, the access of the local leaders to 
national and regional decision-makers is crucial not only to attract more financial resources 
but also to recognize the window of opportunity and to build a composite network of 
support around innovative policy solutions (Mintrom and Norman 2009).  
In other words, policy entrepreneurship must be performed by one or more local 
political leaders working in collaboration with city managers and the leaders of housing 
administrative divisions who are willing to invest ideational, relational and positional 
resources in the policy process. 
The final aim of the analysis is to show how leadership matters for change in housing 
policies under conditions of financial constraints and contentious politics and how the 
collaboration between multiple political and bureaucratic leaders is essential.  
The emphasis on the collective character of these types of activities is new in the 
literature on local political leadership, which usually concentrates on political leaders as 
individuals (Haus and Heinelt 2005; Gains et al. 2009; Svara 2009). Early studies on the 
United States emphasized the entrepreneurial character of individuals in different offices (city 
managers, elected politicians, mayors and leaders of interest groups) creating political 
equilibrium through their innovative policies and their capacity to organize dispersed citizens 
(Schneider and Teske 1992, 741). Similarly, Greasley and Stoker argued that conditions of 
fiscal constraint promote facilitative leadership in networked forms of governance. 
Facilitative leaders are seen as potential regime builders with four characteristics: partnership 
skills, low partisanship, accessibility and visibility, and decision-making capacity (Greasley 
and Stoker 2008, 724). 
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In the European context, mayoral leadership emerges as a key aspect of the policy 
process. In their study of urban leaders, Haus and Heinelt note the importance of a 
multiplicity of actors in the complexity of local governance. In considering the policy process 
and the role of other important but less “political” actors, such as city managers, bureaucrats, 
experts and civic leaders, Haus and Heinelt emphasize the complementarity of (political) 
power sources and urban leaders’ public visibility and accountability (Haus and Heinelt 2005, 
27-28). For example, the mayor assumes the role of the entrepreneur and of the broker 
(Denhardt and Denhardt 2011), while political leaders must cope with the nature of central-
local relations (Kubler and Michel 2006). 
The role of local political leaders can thus be crucial to build networks of actors both 
vertically and horizontally. In the former instance, local political leaders still play an important 
role in the intergovernmental relationships linking the centre and the peripheries (Borraz and 
John 2004; Steyvers 2013), especially in terms of fiscal resources. In the latter, political leaders 
may play a crucial role, involving citizens and the beneficiaries of services in new governance 
arrangements and making connections with local industries, unions, associations and public 
authorities (Bussu and Bartels 2013). 
The importance of local political leadership for governance emerges clearly in the 
Italian case. Traditionally, the mayors act as political entrepreneur to attract resources from 
the central government for their territories. The direct election and the empowerment of 
local executives increased their capacity to act as coalition builders (Dente 1997; Fabbrini 
2001; Pinson 2002; Bobbio 2005; Magnier 2006; Di Giulio et al. 2016). 
Thus, the literature on local political leadership suggests that leaders not only support 
new ideas and governance networks but also help to find financial resources through their 
access to multi-level institutional venues. Leaders actually shape and coordinate local policy 
networks to aggregate a variety of material and immaterial resources, including knowledge. 
To promote housing in the governmental agenda and to innovate policy instruments despite 
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fiscal constraints, I argue that political leaders may engage in three main activities and use 
three main resources. 
The first resource of political leadership at the local level is ideational. Political leaders 
frame policy ideas through discourse, and this framing activity is strategic in a double sense 
(Béland 2016, 738, 741). First, frames allow us to draw on existing ideological repertories to 
make convincing statements. Second, frames allow policy entrepreneurs to build coalitions 
of supporters for their proposals starting from a shared problem definition, which often 
reflects shared values. Overall, framing uses ideas to redefine a problem in connection with 
different policy goals and objectives, and this can be used to build coalitions in support of 
the policy solution (Kingdon 1995). For example, framing housing problems in terms of a 
poor match between demand and offers to boost social inclusion anticipates different policy 
goals (e.g., intervening in the market) and different policy coalitions (e.g., both on the left 
and on the right of the political spectrum) than framing the same problem as a security issue 
(e.g., prioritizing legality as a goal and consolidating a centrist coalition). Thus, promoting a 
new frame is strategic in times of crisis where the scarcity of resources obliges local 
institutions to open to other governance actors and to invent new solutions. 
Ideational resources can also come from collaboration with experts. In this sense, 
another important aspect to consider is the collaboration between political and bureaucratic 
leaders, such as city managers and the head of the housing division or agencies, who control 
the knowledge about the substantive functioning of the policy. Given their role in the 
implementation of the policy, bureaucratic leaders may provide feedback from stakeholders 
and innovative solutions to problems (e.g., the scarce use of a policy instrument, the lack of 
incentives, scattered information about housing demand for public housing and social rents). 
The second resource of political leadership in cities is relational and pertains to 
networking. It derives from the complex nature of governance at the local level and entails 
the capacity to shape the policy network around the issue of housing (in our cases), using 
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those relational resources to coordinate and direct private actors, local stakeholders and the 
local civic society (Navarro-Yáñez et al. 2008). 
The third resource of local leadership is access to policy-makers at different levels of 
government. It refers to the centrality of leaders in intergovernmental relations (Dente 1997) 
and can be measured through the capacity to attract financial resources and fiscal transfers. 
Moreover, the local leader would benefit greatly from proximity to the national government 
and, at the same time, from an international orientation, such as towards those actors and 
institutions that award resources for specific programmes, such as the EU. 
 
 
4. A tablespoon to empty the sea: Policy change in housing policy under constraints 
 
The analysis of several official documents of the Municipality and of the local press 
has been used to identify the main policy goals, the objectives, the instruments and the policy 
frame of the main political and bureaucratic leaders for both cases. This analysis is 
synthetized in Table 1, which shows that policy change was more evident in the case of Turin 
than in the case of Florence. This analysis seems to confirm the results of previous studies 
on Turin as a case of innovation in housing policies (Governa and Saccomanni 2009). 
Turin and Florence share the majority of policy objectives (decentralization, increasing 
the amount of resources, increasing the number of housing assignations) but differ in the 
general view of the role of the Municipality in the market (facilitator vs. regulator), of the 
relationship with the private actors (collaboration vs. supervision) and in the adoption of 
related policy instruments (active vs. reactive). The main difference is that Turin interpreted 
its general goals on housing differently from the past, proposing a shift from pure assistance 
to the development of opportunities for more inclusive welfare and a more equitable market. 
This idea spread due to a new framing of the role of the Municipality, namely, as a mediator 
between tenants and landlords in the housing market. In contrast, Florence saw housing in 
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light of extreme poverty and marginalization. It framed this issue mostly as a security 
problem in which the main duties of the Municipality were to face illegal occupation and to 
provide more public housing. Florence saw itself as a traditional public actor in the 
decentralized asset of housing policy. 
Moreover, the policy instruments and the actual policy outputs were different. First, Turin 
was better able to secure financial resources in this housing than other welfare sectors. The 
current expenditure for housing in Turin represented a higher and growing share of total 
expenditure than in Florence (see Table 2). Though Turin was traditionally more sensitive to 
housing distress, the choice to secure resources on this policy was an explicit strategy of the 
governing coalition to compensate the advantages of urban elites with more welfare services 
(TO2).  Second, Turin was able to obtain more resources from national instruments of 
financing, such as the abovementioned Fondo Sociale per l’Affitto (law 431/98), to subsidize 
citizens for the renting of houses (see Fig 1). Most importantly, Turin experimented with 
new policy instruments in collaboration with the main local bank foundation, the Compagnia 
di San Paolo (CSP), which became a stable partner in experimental projects on social and co-
housing (TO5). Hence, with regard to the policy outputs, Florence was not necessarily less 
effective than Turin, but it was less innovative. 
The most relevant innovation in this sense was represented by the creation of a local 
office, Lo.Ca.Re, to act as an institutional mediator in the housing market, thus promoting 
and sponsoring the subscription of subsidized rents. This action implied additional public 
expenditure (which was critical for Turin). Nonetheless, it provided an alternative and less 
expensive instrument than traditional construction and management of ERP. 
As noted, both cities attempted to promote social rents as innovative policy 
instruments to respond to increasing housing demand. If we consider the policy outputs, 
both cities showed the administrative capacity to respond to the demand for different forms 
of housing (see the trends in available resources in Figure 1 and the ratios between 
applications and assignment for subsidized rents in Table 3). Nonetheless, Turin was more 
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active in finding new ways to increase the stock of public housing. The Municipality of Turin 
purchased new units that were originally built for the Olympic games and that involved some 
modifications to the land use plan (344 and 124 of a total of 612 new ERP housing purchased 
from 2000 to 2010). At the same time, Turin recruited new specialized staff to develop 
projects of housing restyling and renovation financed by the European Union, as in the case 
of the experimental “Peripheries project” that started in 1997. The “Peripheries project” and 
the “Urban” initiatives of the European Union represented two windows of opportunity to 
move housing to the top of the governmental agenda and to propose innovation in the 
instruments of traditional housing, starting with renovation experiments.  
Overall, it is clear that Turin was able to foster a more visible policy change given the 
ideational shift in both the goals and the frames of housing policies, the variety of the policy 
instruments, and the quantity and quality of policy outputs in traditional public housing and 
in subsidized rents. Moreover, local press and some commissioned reports on the 
implementation of specific housing and regeneration programmes (such as Winkler 2007) 
reported the satisfaction of the main stakeholders involved in these initiatives. 
 
5. Weaving nets: The ideational, relational and positional dimensions of leadership 
in housing policies 
 
After assessing the presence of policy change, the analysis turns to the reconstruction 
of the policy process to determine whether the ideational, relational and positional resources 
of political leadership played a role. 
5.1 Ideational resources 
With regard to ideational resources, local political leadership should be able to promote 
innovation in goals, objectives and instruments through the use of frames. To analyse this 
ideational dimension, political leaders, municipal officers and a limited number of prominent 
actors in housing policy were asked who elaborated the programmatic document on social 
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housing; if and when housing policy was at the top of the governmental agenda; and what 
the leaders did to promote their ideas.  
In Turin, housing policy entered the agenda immediately after the elections of 1997. 
Mayor Castellani started his second mandate after a close electoral victory thanks to a political 
allegiance with the left party Rifondazione Comunista, which explicitly asked for the 
introduction of renovation programmes in the periphery of the city (TO1). Hence, the mayor 
first appointed to the executive two former regional officers with expertise in housing in the 
local executive (giunta) and as the head of experimental programmes. Second, he introduced 
a special project for the renovation of the peripheries, thus anticipating national policies on 
integrated urban programmes. Third, he supported the integration of urban renovation 
projects and housing through the modification of the land use planning (TO2; TO4).  
Before that time, housing policies were not integrated with other policies and were 
mainly focused on the implementation of national and regional legislation (TO10). From 
1997 onwards, housing policies aimed to ameliorate the life condition of vulnerable citizens, 
including the young and immigrants, and social housing was seen as an opportunity to boost 
the private market. The political leadership framed the demand for subsidized rents as an 
opportunity for both the tenants and the landlords, proposing that the Municipal offices 
guarantee the contracts. 
The political leadership in Turin (the mayor, the deputy mayor and the city manager in 
particular) also linked this new frame of housing as an opportunity to the experimentation 
of instruments such as participatory planning. The first participatory planning served to 
create mutual recognition among actors in the city and helped housing and renovation 
programmes to develop (TO8; TO9; TO10). In other words, the framing of social housing 
as an opportunity was coherent with the overall idea of a new renaissance for Turin. In turn, 
this coherence allowed the leadership to capitalize on relational resources derived from 
participation. In the same period, political leaders took advantage of the activation of 
  16 
financial resources at the European level by promoting and then winning several projects 
linked to the Urban programme (TO1; TO2; TO4; TO7).  
In the following years, important reforms in national housing policy occurred, and two 
main initiatives were introduced in the programme by Mayor Chiamparino and by the 
member of the executive in charge of housing. The innovative policy instruments in housing 
were elaborated through collaboration with the local councillors, on one side, and with the 
municipal head of the division for housing, Giovanni Magnano, on the other side. 
The first innovative instrument was the creation of a permanent municipal commission 
for housing emergency, the Commissione per l’emergenza abitativa (CEA), which is involved 
in housing assignments (TO6; TO3). In addition to being a means to monitor applications 
and to readily answer housing requests, the CEA was created as “a way to tie our own hands 
on assignations” (TO6). At that time, the Italian legislation left ample margins for local 
governments to distribute public housing. The CEA was also meant to restrict these margins 
and to isolate the decision-makers from distributive and clientelistic pressures. 
 The second innovation was a brand-new municipal office called Lo.Ca.Re. as a policy 
instrument to tackle the subsidized rents problem. The office was created in 2000 as a free-
of-charge service for selected low-income tenants to be matched with accredited owners. 
The local political and bureaucratic leadership used Lo.Ca.Re. to promote a new role for the 
Municipality by “acting as one among other players in the housing private market, to match 
demands for housing by the disadvantaged citizens with the offers of housing, in a period of 
growing economic crisis and housing distress” (TO6). 
The introduction of these innovations was the product of the collaboration between 
the former municipal councillor and member of the executive charged with housing (the 
assessore) and the director of the municipal division on housing. The interviews indicate that 
during the negotiations with the tenants and owners, the political leader promoted the idea 
that the final goal of housing was not based on a dependency culture and proposed a different 
frame of housing as an opportunity. At the same time, the bureaucratic leader suggested 
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exploiting the legislation on rent subsidies to incentivize the subsidized rents. This shift in in 
the frame and in the instruments was possible due to the ability of both the political and the 
bureaucratic leadership to create trust: “They feel they can trust the administration, and in 
due time, the number of the subsidized rents increased” (TO6).  
The Municipality of Florence created a new office for the management of the housing 
market with subsidized rents, the Agenzia per la Casa S.p.A., but this innovation was promoted 
only in 2009. This office works to collect information about the local housing market and is 
presented as a more “friendly” instrument than the traditional territorial pacts with syndicates 
on subsidized rents (FI5; FI6). Overall, the policy goal of providing housing as social 
assistance remained uncontested, and housing policies were framed as security and budgetary 
problems that were not integrated with other policies. The construction of new public 
dwellings and the renovation of existing ones was a stable objective of the governing coalition 
until 2009 (FI1; FI2; FI5). The pressure on the region to attract financial resources was not 
able to meet the housing demands (FI4; FI5; F17). Moreover, the Municipality participated 
in the (few) calls for projects on housing issued from local foundations and banks but was 
unable to find additional resources or to promote experimental projects. Overall, the 
attempts to innovate and to extend the governance network were timid and unsuccessful. 
5.2 Relational resources 
Florence is different from Turin in the second dimension of leadership, namely, 
political leaders’ relational resources and networking capacity. This analysis was conducted 
by asking if and how the political leader attempted to build the support for the policy 
solutions among local stakeholders (public and private). In Florence, interviews revealed the 
existence of an institutional network composed of the local authorities, the representatives 
of the main interest groups and unions, the provincial governor (in Italian, Prefetto), the police 
and the regional officers. From 2009 on, the leaders attempted to extend their network to 
local banks and foundations. The interviews indicate that the attempts to extend the network 
were not satisfactory because the local bank foundations and other private actors preferred 
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to finance initiatives in other policy sectors (e.g., culture, education and social assistance). At 
the same time, the Municipality constantly faced the protest of the social movement ‘Fight 
for the house’, which acted against the local government by occupying empty public 
properties, forcing the Municipality to invest resources to face abusive occupations (FI5; FI8; 
FI10).  
In Turin, the network-building activity involved more political leaders across levels of 
government and was able to include local bank foundations such as the CSP (TO2; TO5). 
The expansion of the network started immediately after 1997, when the governing coalition 
deputed the local politicians of the left to be responsible urban renovation projects. This 
political activism attracted public managers from other institutions to collaborate with the 
different projects with particular reference to the recruiting of experienced regional officers 
in public housing and planning. Moreover, especially after 2006, the CSP Foundation started 
several experimental projects in social housing through collaboration with the City of Turin. 
The political leadership thus created a composite network of public and private actors that 
shared the idea of housing as a welfare priority and as an opportunity. 
5.3 Access to policy-makers and centre-periphery relations 
The capacity to build networks is linked to the third and final dimension of political 
leadership in housing, namely, its ability to have access to other policy-makers and to attract 
financial resources. The policy outputs on housing also depend on the relationship between 
the Municipality and the region (for traditional housing), private partners, and the European 
Union (for specific experimental projects, such as co-housing and urban renovation).  
The analysis of municipal budgets and of specific funds shows that the leadership in 
Turin managed to find more resources. This was possible thanks to the international 
networking of Mayor Castellani, later to the growing centrality of Mayor Chiamparino inside 
its own party, the Partito Democratico (PD) at the national level, and finally to the attempts 
of the city manager towards policy integration. Two events worked as windows of 
opportunity for housing:  the planning and the winning of the Winter Olympic Games 
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(WOG) (TO8). The interviews revealed that both events were strongly supported by Mayor 
Castellani and by the city manager Vaciago and were intended to work with the local experts 
and the stakeholders, following the examples of cities such as Barcelona and Bilbao. In 
particular, the WOG was exploited as an opportunity to acquire new housing stocks in the 
post-event phase. The approval of specific rules to incentivize social housing and the 
modifications of the land use plan to increase the number of residential dwellings are clear 
examples of this strategy.  
Another example relates to the ability to attract resources from the territory. After 
2006, incentives and guarantee funds (issued by Lo.Ca.Re) were financed based on resources 
from the Region Piedmont, while the two local bank foundations financed the guarantee 
fund of the Municipality of Turin against the emergency caused by dispossession, renewed 
in 2013. Interestingly, the continuous commitment of CSP to housing may have influenced 
the composition of the governing coalition of the city in the long run. The fact that the 
deputy mayor of the Municipality in 2011 was part of Ufficio Pio, an organization linked to 
CSP, could be a clue for future research on the evolution of the élite in Turin (Belligni e 
Ravazzi 2012).  
In contrast, political leaders in Florence were unable to find additional resources and 
seemed less effective in their pressure strategy towards the region of Tuscany. Most of all, 
they could not rely on the intervention of local banks and other private actors, which “simply 
awarded other type of initiatives than our housing projects” (FI5). After 2009, the political 
leaders of Florence attempted to take advantage of the transfer of some public properties 
from the State to the local authorities and to renovate them as public housing. 
5.4 Discussion 
The analysis of the ideational, relational and positional resources of political leadership 
confirms the relevance of political and bureaucratic leaders to agenda setting and policy 
formulation in housing. The ability to strongly innovate in ideas, frames and instruments 
characterized local political leadership in Turin, suggesting that successful policy 
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entrepreneurship in multi-level policies needs not only new ideas and networking capacity, 
as theorized by the public policy literature, but also centrality in the centre-periphery 
relations, especially to gather additional financial resources. Moreover, the analysis shows the 
importance of the collective character of leadership involving both political and bureaucratic 
leaders. Collaboration between politicians and technicians produces innovative solutions, 
allowing technical knowledge on policy content to be combined with a coherent framing of 
policy interventions. 
Skilful leadership also allows public managers to learn from successful models from 
abroad while maintaining a strong commitment to the day-by-day management of public 
housing. Moreover, the pivotal role played by leadership as a collective effort is crucial to 
extend the policy network towards private actors and the local bank foundations. Hence, the 
political leadership in Turin was plural, with the local government committed to steering the 
policy process but far from the sole character on the scene. Thus, thanks to the work of 
political and bureaucratic leaders, policy change was driven not only by exogenous events 
but also by the ability to exploit different opportunities at the national and European levels 
(e.g., the WOG and the URBAN programmes). Moreover, the political leaders took 
advantage of the political opportunity structure at the time (Vitale 2015). The close electoral 
competition facilitated the move of welfare to the top of the governmental agenda. 
In Florence, local political leadership was more restricted in number and strongly 
institutional. Innovative policy instruments were only recently introduced. The leadership 
instead showed a tendency to act through less experimental schemes, following a sort of local 
neo-corporatism in which the Municipality interacts only with the main representatives of 
the associations of owners and the tenants. Moreover, the structure of the local leadership 
in Florence seemed less plural and multi-levelled, with few attempts to create stable 
relationships with the European and the regional levels of government. The more traditional 
character of political leadership in Florence matched with the absence of a credible 
commitment of strong financial supporters at the local level. In this sense, in Florence, the 
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leaders interpreted their role as “caretakers”, effective but unable to manage complex 
coalitions, while Turin experienced a collective leadership of “consensual facilitators” able to 
create a network of public and private partners across the local and national levels (John and 
Cole 1999, 102). 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The main argument of this paper is that local political leadership matters for policy 
change in housing policies, other things being equal. My aim was neither to provide a 
complete account of all the complex variables that may influence policy change in their 
outcomes but rather to focus on the agency role of political leaders by describing the 
resources they may invest in two cases of multi-level policy that matters for local welfare. 
The cases of Turin and Florence suggest that leadership matters for policy change a) 
when it is able to elaborate a new and coherent frame for innovative policy goals and means, 
b) when it is able to build wide horizontal networks at the local level, and c) when it is able 
to access different levels of government to attract resources and to take advantage of 
windows of opportunity at the national and international level. In the case of housing policy, 
when political leadership is plural in its composition and multi-level in its positioning, the 
contemporary presence in the European, state and regional arenas may foster more resources 
for housing policy. Political leaders seem to be able to weave different nets of actors by 
collecting a variety of resources and, at the same time, trying not to be trapped in one single 
net. This is even more the case in times of austerity as fiscal transfers from the central state 
for housing are drastically diminishing while the scarcity of public resources has increased 
the territorial differentiation of local welfare.  
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Table 1 – Policy change in policy goals, frame, objectives, instruments and outputs in Turin and Florence (policy changes are in bold) 
Case Policy goals  Policy frame Policy objective Policy instruments Observed policy outputs 
HOUSING 
POLICIES 
in TURIN 
1997-2011 
From a 
dependency 
culture to housing 
as both welfare 
and opportunity 
Changing the role of 
the Municipality: not 
only direct 
intervention but also 
mediation in the 
housing market 
More economic 
support for 
housing distress  
More spending in housing than in other welfare 
sectors Increase in municipal expenditure on housing (as expected) 
More effectiveness 
in public housing 
stock and 
assignations 
Implementation of decentralization and reform of 
municipal regulations on housing  
Reservation of public housing in renovation 
projects and new buildings 
Creation of a guarantee fund against housing 
emergency, cofounded by local foundations. 
Creation of the CEA commission to tie 
politicians’ hands on assignations. 
Approval of new municipal regulations (as expected) 
Increase of the stock of public housing (ERP) (as expected) 
Increase in the assignation of public housing (measured as demands 
presented/demands awarded) (as expected) 
Social mix in the assignations of public housing (as expected) 
Promotion of 
subsidized rents 
and experimental 
social housing  
Creation of the municipal office Lo.CaRe as an 
innovative policy instrument for the Municipality 
to act in the real estate market 
Co-financing and co-planning of social housing 
with private local actors  
Increase of subsidized rent contracts (as expected)  
Integration of housing policies with other policies via 
European projects (The Gate, Urban II, others)  
Social housing and co-housing experiments with the CSP (as 
expected) 
HOUSING 
POLICIES 
in Florence 
1995-2011 
Public housing aims 
at social assistance 
Housing distress 
worsened by security 
problems: Municipality 
must provide better 
housing and fight illegal 
occupations 
Implementation of 
national laws on 
housing 
decentralization 
1a. Approval of new municipal regulations on 
housing and implementation of bids for social 
housing 
1b. Creation of CASA spa for the municipal 
management of public ERP; creation of the office 
Agenzia per la casa (2009) to act as mediator in 
the housing markets  
1a. Approval of regulations and awarding of public housing 
(ERP) (as expected) 
1b. Moderate increase in the stock of ERP and renovations but 
overall decrease in the assignations of both ERP and subsidized 
rents (measured as demands presented/demands awarded) (not 
expected) 
More economic 
support for 
housing distress 
Increase in municipal expenditure for housing, per 
year 
2a. Decrease in current expenditure for housing, per year (not 
expected) 
Pressure on 
national and 
regional 
governments for 
more resources 
Increase in national and regional financial 
commitment towards housing policies; search for 
financial support for housing projects 
 
4a. No increase in national and regional transfers (not expected) 
no financial support from private actors for experimental projects 
(not expected) 
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Table 2 - Percentage of welfare spending on total current expenditure and distribution among service 
categories, Municipalities of Florence and Turin  
 
Disaggregated welfare 
expenditure for: 
Municipality of TURIN Municipality of FLORENCE  
 1998 2000 2002 2005 2000 2003 2005 2008 
% of welfare on total 
current expenditure 
(all categories) 
20.0 19.8 20.0 22.4 16.9 16.8 17.1 18.9 
Nursery and related 
services 
18.0 15.7 15.6 15.3 29.8 35.4 36.5 39.3 
Prevention and 
rehabilitation services 
4.8 4.1 3.9 3.4 4.3 6.4 7.5 8.4 
Residential care homes 10.9 11.8 11.2 10.9 27.6 18.6 15.8 12.5 
Assistance and other 
individual services  
54.0 54.8 54.8 56.0 32.3 34.9 36.0 35.9 
Cemeteries 7.0 5.9 6.0 8.1 4.2 3.6 2.7 3.4 
Social housing 5.4 7.7 8.4 6.3 1.8 1.1 1.5 0.5 
Welfare TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: accounting certificates, finanza locale, Dipartimento per gli affare interni e territoriali, Governo Italiano. 
  29 
 
 
Figure 1 - Total resources (including transfers, in euro) for subsidised rents ex law 431/98 (Fondo 
nazionale per l’affitto), Municipality of Turin and of Florence 
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Table 3  - Subsidized rents ex law 431/98 (Fondo nazionale e regionale di sostegno alla locazione), 
demands presented and entitled, Municipality of Turin and of Florence 
 
 Turin Florence 
Year Demands 
presented (E) 
Demands 
entitled (F) 
E/F Demands 
presented (G) 
Demand 
entitled (H) 
G/H 
2000 11468 10.083 87,9 - -  
2001 14804 12.929 87,3 - -  
2002 11915 9.687 81,3 - -  
2003 10607 9.733 91,8 1.857 1.649 88,8 
2004 13649 10.988 80,5 1.993 1.701 85,3 
2005 14571 11.664 80,0 1.838 1.622 88,2 
2006 14651 11.980 81,8 1.899 1.690 89,0 
2007 15655 13.057 83,4 1.541 1.362 88,4 
2008 13073 10.810 82,7 2.147 1.833 85,4 
2009 13360 11.517 86,2 2.123 1.709 80,5 
Source: Muncipality of Florence for Nomisma, dimensioni del disagio abitativo e strategie di intervento, 
il caso di Firenze, 2010, page 55. 
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Appendix - List of semi-structured interviews 
For housing policy in Turin 
TO1  member of the executive, urban renovation and 
peripheries project 1997-2001 (29/04/2011)  
TO2  mayor of Turin 1993-2001 (11/4/11) 
TO3  mayor of Turin 2001-2011 (20/4/11) 
TO4  member of the executive, urban planning 1993-2001 
(05/05/2011) 
TO5  Compagnia di San Paolo, General Secretary 
(20/06/2011) 
TO6  director, peripheries project (until 2001) and division 
housing of the Municipality of Turin (12/4/11) (12/5/11)
  
TO7  director, budget of the Municipality of Turin
 (28/04/2011)  
TO8  city manager (6/4/11) 
TO9  director, strategic planning (08/04/2011)  
TO10  member of the executive, housing (until 2001) and 
urban planning (20/4/11) 
For housing in Florence 
FI1 member of the executive, social distress 2004-
2009 (28/02/2011) 
FI2 Mayor of Florence 1999-2009 (16/02/2011) 
FI3 director, urban planning (20/05/2011) 
FI4 member of the executive, housing 
(21/03/2011) 
FI5 director, housing division (03/02/2011) 
FI6  area manger development (22/02/2011) 
FI7 area manager welfare (17/02/2011) 
FI8 Mayor of Florence 1995-1999 (08/02/201)
  
FI9 member of the executive, social assistance 
(08/06/2011) 
FI10 councillor (8/03/2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
